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During three months in 1994, genocide was committed in Rwanda.
Two years after those events, and notwithstanding efforts at both national
and international levels to bring the perpetrators to justice, the first case
has yet to go to trial. Over the past months, I have worked closely with
the government of Rwanda on justice issues in the course of a research
project that I am doing on the role of national and international tribunals in
the former Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, and Rwanda. I would like to share with
you some observations arising from that work. I will examine the
approaches to justice that have been employed in Rwanda, and consider
some of the obstacles that have been confronted despite, or, in some
instances, because of, the approaches taken. I will first discuss the
recently enacted Rwandan legislation on the handling of genocide-related
cases, and then examine the interaction of national and international
tribunals as they exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the Rwandan context.
I will conclude by briefly considering some of the broader implications of
the Rwandan experience.
I.

JUSTICE IN THE WAKE OF GENOCIDE

Rwanda was largely destroyed in the spring of 1994. About ten
percent of the population was massacred. Another twenty-five percent of
the population fled the country. The physical infrastructure of the country
was substantially damaged, and the treasury was looted.
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Along with the overall destruction of Rwanda in the spring of 1994
came the devastation of Rwanda's judicial structures. The great majority
of judicial and law enforcement personnel were killed or fled the country.
Even the basic materials needed to run a legal system - books, vehicles,
even paper - were essentially unavailable. And if there was a vehicle
available, then there was no gasoline. It was in this context that Rwanda
confronted the question of how to pursue justice in the wake of genocide.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
In September of 1994, the new government of Rwanda requested
that the United Nations establish an International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR). As negotiations over the terms for establishment of an
ICTR proceeded, however, Rwanda objected to a number of provisions.
The objections related to the absence of a death penalty in the ICTR
Statute, that the seat of the ICTR would be outside of Rwanda, and a
number of other issues. By strange coincidence, Rwanda held a seat on
the United Nations Security Council [hereinafter Security Council] at that
time. Ironically, because of its objections to the ICTR Statute, Rwanda
cast the sole vote opposing adoption of the Security Council resolution
establishing the ICTR.
Nevertheless, the ICTR was established; and Rwanda ultimately
expressed its intention to cooperate with its work. Now, two years after
its establishment, the ICTR, barring further delays, will begin its first trial
in several weeks.'
But the ICTR is not expected by any means to address the bulk of
Rwanda's staggering volume of genocide-related cases. Rwanda's prison
population has grown to over 80,000 virtually all awaiting prosecution for
genocide-related crimes. The equivalent proportion of the American
population would amount to 3,000,000 prisoners. The caseload of the
ICTR is expected to be in the hundreds at most.
III. NATIONAL JUSTICE
So Rwanda is faced with the enormous problem of how to handle
the other 80,000 plus criminal cases arising from the genocide.
Specialized legislation to facilitate handling of those cases was drafted over
the course of the past several months and was enacted this past September
1st.
Drafting that legislation required finding a path through an array of
profoundly problematic options. The Rwandan criminal justice system had
1.
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never been equipped to handle a large volume of cases, and it had been
entirely disabled during the violence. It tried zero cases in 1995. That
was the justice system that had to manage, in some way, to handle 80,000
serious criminal cases (mostly murders). The defendants in those cases
were already in prison, having been arrested by soldiers of the rebel army
that halted the genocide. So even just doing nothing was not an option.
This criminal justice crisis had to be met with almost no resources, barely
any trained personnel and, even worse, in a highly volatile political
environment.
The specialized criminal justice program laid out in the law that
was passed to respond to this situation is quite simple. Suspects will be
classified into four categories according to their degrees of culpability.
The most culpable category will include leaders and organizers of the
genocide and perpetrators of particularly heinous murders or sexual
torture. All others who committed homicides will come within category
Two. Category Three will include perpetrators of grave assaults against
the person not resulting in death. And those who committed property
crimes in connection with the genocide will fall into category Four.
This specialized criminal justice program will rely heavily on a
system of plea agreements. All perpetrators other than those in category
One will be entitled to receive a reduced sentence as part of a guilty-plea
agreement. Specifically, a pre-set, fixed reduction in the penalty that
would otherwise be imposed is available to all non-category One
perpetrators in return for an accurate and complete confession, a plea of
guilty to the crimes committed, and an apology to the victims. A greater
penalty reduction is made available to perpetrators who confess and plead
guilty prior to prosecution than to perpetrators who come forward only
after prosecution has begun.
The requirement of a detailed confession was thought to be
important for purposes of establishing a truthful historical record of the
Rwandan genocide; for purposes of allowing for meaningful verification of
the accuracy of the confession; and for purposes of assisting in
prosecutors' continuing investigations and prosecutions of other cases.
The additional requirement that a perpetrator make an apology to the
victims is intended to contribute to the process of national healing. While
it is true that defendants will have an ulterior motive for making these
apologies to obtain reduced sentences, the apologies nevertheless are
thought to represent at least some acknowledgment of wrongdoing, which
in the aggregate, may contribute to reconciliation.
This specialized criminal justice program represents a complex
compromise. While regular criminal prosecution of every suspected
perpetrator might in many respects have been most desirable, the resources
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demanded by such an approach would quickly overwhelm national
capacities. Therefore, a decision has been made in Rwanda to establish a
program which, it is hoped, will accomplish the crucial purposes of
criminal justice while also respecting resource limitations.
An approach such as that adopted in Rwanda offers the benefit of
expediency in the handling of an enormous volume of cases and may make
some contribution to national reconciliation. At the same time, there is
reason for concern about the potential for miscarriage of justice under such
a system. Factually innocent suspects may choose to plead guilty for fear
of a worse outcome at trial or to avoid extensive delays before trial. These
concerns are exacerbated by the fact that no provision has been made for
any form of defense counsel for the many indigent defendants in Rwanda
(though a program for training lay defense counsel as counterparts to the
lay prosecutors in Rwanda is currently under consideration). Moreover,
and on the other side of the equation, survivors and others rightly ask why
perpetrators of these horrific crimes should receive leniency, especially
when an "ordinary criminal" who committed a murder in Rwanda
tomorrow would not receive the same benefit.
The question to ask in evaluating legal responses in the complex
situations surrounding crimes of mass violence is: What action will do the
most good and the least harm under the circumstances? Full trial of
80,000 defendants, more than one percent of the national population,
would be infeasible in even the wealthiest nation and is emphatically not an
option in Rwanda.
The alternative at the other extreme, releasing
prisoners en masse under an explicit or implicit grant of amnesty, would
perpetuate a culture of impunity in a country with a long history of interethnic violence, would be unacceptable to the survivor population, and
would constitute a heightened risk to security, both of the regime and of
the individuals released. The value of the system adopted in Rwanda will
depend in the end both on the soundness of the design itself and on the
quality of its implementation which will unfold in the coming months.
IV. THE TRIALS OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
The administration of justice in post-genocide Rwanda is rendered
uniquely complex by the fact that concurrent jurisdiction for the genociderelated crimes is actively exercised by two different entities:
the
government of Rwanda and the ICTR. This concurrent jurisdiction has
exposed difficult issues which are likely to recur in future contexts.
Concurrent jurisdiction raises complex questions regarding
cooperation in investigations and the sharing of evidence. Obvious
advantages are to be gained by close national and international cooperation
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in investigations and evidence-gathering.
But difficulties concerning
confidentiality of evidence, witness protection, due process standards, and
the need to avoid any appearance of partiality of the international tribunal
raise delicate questions which have yet to be systematically addressed.
Discussion of these matters has been ongoing between the ICTR and the
government of Rwanda. But the issues, for the most part, remain largely
open.
An area which has been of particular concern in the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction is the distribution of defendants between the
national and international fora.
This issue has been the cause of
uncertainty, and, at times, of tension between national governments and
the ICTR. On more than one occasion, the ICTR and the government of
Rwanda have sought to obtain custody of the same suspect. In one case,
not only the ICTR and the Rwandan government, but also the Belgian
government were attempting to gain custody of the same suspects who
were being held in Cameroon. As an aside, I should also note that, while
many speculated that these conflicts over custody were really illusory
because no country would be willing to transfer a suspect to Rwanda, that
speculation has proven false. At least one defendant has already been
transferred to Rwanda by Ethiopia, and other countries have expressed a
willingness in principle to do the same.
The tensions between the government of Rwanda and the ICTR
over distribution of defendants have resulted, in part, from a lack of
communication over time and perhaps in part from a more fundamental
conflict of interests or, at least, of agendas. When the ICTR was
established, the Rwandan government had not yet decided upon an
approach to national prosecutions. The approach ultimately adopted was
one that relies heavily on plea agreements, as I have discussed. That pleaagreement program turned out to be somewhat incompatible with the
operation of an international tribunal that views its mandate as prosecuting
the top-level leaders of the genocide.
The reasons for this incompatibility are easy to understand. The
leniency in sentencing that goes with plea agreements can easily create a
perception that impunity has prevailed - unless at least the leaders are
fully prosecuted and punished. If, however, the leaders are taken to an
international tribunal, and there receive more favorable treatment than they
would in the national courts, then this leaves a gap in the national justice
picture. This more favorable treatment enjoyed by defendants at the
international tribunal includes escaping the death penalty (which may be
imposed by Rwandan courts, but not by the ICTR); likely being
imprisoned in more favorable conditions than those in Rwandan prisons;
and being guaranteed various due process safeguards including appointed
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defense counsel, among other factors. So, then, if the leaders are away
receiving international justice which is perceived as lenient, and the
followers are at home getting bargains in the national justice system, then
no one is punished fully and severely, relative to national standards, for
the horrors that were committed. A perception may thus be created,
especially among the survivor population, that the plea-agreement program
is really a program of impunity. So you can see why trying at least some
category One defendants is so important to Rwanda.
This problem became apparent over time. After the ICTR had
been in place for many months, and when ICTR personnel thought that the
Tribunal was finally showing results and deserved to be congratulated, the
Tribunal, instead, was reaping the wrath of the Rwandans each time it
pursued a leader to be prosecuted. ICTR personnel and supporters found
this wrath especially difficult to accept since Rwanda had not managed
actually to begin any trials, of leaders or otherwise. The Rwandans, in
reply, noted that the ICTR had been no swifter, and had so far also tried
no one. This friction was caused at least in part by the fact that the parties
had not communicated regarding policies to govern the distribution of
defendants in light of the national justice program as it evolved.
On the authority of the Security Council Resolution that brought
the ICTR into being, the ICTR enjoys primacy of jurisdiction. This means
that, where the ICTR and a national body each have a legal basis for
jurisdiction over a given case, the ICTR is entitled, but not obliged, to
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the national body (a defendant
cannot be tried by both). But the criteria to be employed in deciding
whether to exercise jurisdiction in any particular case have yet to be
articulated by the ICTR. Conflicts over exercise of jurisdiction that have
arisen have been resolved on an ad hoc basis.
A more satisfactory basis for consistent decision making regarding
the distribution of defendants will have to rest upon a careful analysis of
the purposes of the ICTR and of its concurrent jurisdiction with national
courts. This analytic process still remains to be completed.
Identifying the appropriate criteria for distribution of defendants
between national and international fora is tricky within any one context.
The issues are further complicated when one recognizes the need to
articulate underlying principles and guidelines that will serve across
contexts - in Bosnia or in Croatia as well as in Rwanda, and very likely,
in future instances as well.
In anticipation of such future instances, a statute for a permanent
International Criminal Court is currently under consideration by the United
Nations. That draft statute to some extent averts potential conflicts over
defendants by giving deference to national-level prosecutions under most

1997]

Morris

695

circumstances.
But those provisions giving deference to national
jurisdictions would not apply where the international criminal court's
jurisdiction had been invoked by the Security Council, as can occur under
the draft statute.
In such instances, the same difficulties regarding
distribution of defendants as have arisen in Rwanda would be likely to
recur.
Further, the draft statute for a permanent International Criminal
Court does not directly address whether an international court's role is
especially tied to trying leadership-level defendants. Article 35(c) of that
draft statute provides that the International Criminal Court may decide
"that a case before it is inadmissible on the ground that the crime in
question . . is not of such gravity to justify further action by the Court."
One might imagine that such a provision, if adopted, would form the basis
for an admissibility challenge by a defendant, such as Dusko Tadic, the
defendant currently being tried at the Hague, who was not in a leadership
position in the overall criminal enterprise. Such a challenge would be
based on the proposition that gravity includes within its meaning the notion
of leadership or other special responsibility. The claim, in other words,
would be that it is not the role of an international court to try small fry, as
President Cassesse of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals recently
implied.
Not only those issues concerning distribution of defendants, but
also the dilemmas that arise more generally from concurrent jurisdiction
are starkly posed in the context of Rwanda. But Rwanda is unlikely to
remain unique in this respect. The same problems predictably will arise in
future contexts where concurrent jurisdiction is actively exercised. Many
of these issues are currently under debate by the United Nations
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court. The broad range of issues concerning the interaction of national
and international jurisdictions forms the basis for ongoing debates on
complementarity between national criminal jurisdictions and a permanent
international criminal court.
A threshold requirement for greater coherence in the interaction of
national and international jurisdictions is a clear articulation, in each case
in which an international tribunal is to be convened, of the needs which
that particular tribunal is intended to meet. The needs that are likely to be
present in greater or lesser degree, singly or in combination include:
responding to an overwhelmed national justice system; substituting for a
national system in which the fact or appearance of bias would substantially
undermine justice processes; substituting for a national justice system
where the national system would be unable to obtain custody of suspects,
and expressing, through the exercise of international jurisdiction, a
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universal condemnation of some special feature of the crimes in question
such as the special international responsibility of certain perpetrators. So,
the purposes for an international tribunal will not be identical across
contexts.
Two important benefits can be gained by articulating in each
context the particular needs to be met by convening that international
tribunal. First, such an articulation will permit confirmation of whether an
international tribunal will best serve the goals sought in that particular
context. For instance, if the purpose is to respond to a situation where the
national justice system is overwhelmed, then we can analyze whether it is
best to provide an international tribunal or to provide assistance to the
national system, or some combination of the two.
Second, having
reference to clearly articulated purposes for convening an international
tribunal will allow the operation of that particular tribunal, and especially
its interaction with national jurisdictions, to be appropriately tailored to
those goals. For example, if the purpose is to substitute for national courts
where they cannot obtain custody, then arguably, that international tribunal
should defer to the national justice system if that national system can gain
custody in a particular case. By contrast, if the purpose is to express
universal condemnation of certain crimes, then that international tribunal
may wish to exercise jurisdiction even where the national court could gain
custody. In that sort of instance, a very careful analysis would be required
of how the international interest in universal condemnation should be
weighed against the national (and international) interest in successful
operation of the national justice system if the two should conflict. In sum,
it will be essential to the fruitful operation of an international court that its
purposes are clearly articulated in each instance and that its operations are
appropriately tailored to those purposes in each case.
V. THE FUTURE IN RWANDA AND BEYOND
In Rwanda, the performance of the national justice system and that
of the ICTR remain to be seen. Two years after the massacres and yet
before the first trial in either jurisdiction, it is clear that the best form of
justice that the ICTR or the national courts will be able to render will be
justice delayed. The slow progress of justice in Rwanda points to needs
for protocols for prompt international assistance to national justice
systems; for permanent bodies, such as an International Criminal Court,
that can be put readily into service when warranted; and for clear
articulation of the purposes of each international tribunal in order that both
national and international jurisdictions may be as effective as possible in
responding to crimes of mass violence.

